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Damages for the Wrongful Birth of Healthy Babies
I. INTRODUCTION
A portion of our society today has reached a deliberate determi-
nation to avoid parenthood, and has consciously sought to prevent
childbirth through various methods. For example, contraceptives,
abortions, tubal ligations, and vasectomies have provided many
people with reliable childbirth prevention. However, efforts to pre-
vent conception or childbirth have been unsuccessful when frus-
trated through another's negligence. While most jurisdictions have
recognized a cause of action for "wrongful birth,"' a serious ques-
tion exists in determining how courts should measure the recovery
of damages when parents, who never wanted to conceive a child
and who actively sought to prevent parenthood, give birth to nor-
mal, healthy babies.2
The frustration of parental choice can be illustrated in situations
in which a surgeon negligently performs an abortion or sterilization
1. This comment will use the term "wrongful birth" although various other terms have
been used to refer to the same cause of action. Wrongful birth actions are distinguishable
from "wrongful life" actions, which are brought on behalf of the children themselves, seek-
ing damages respecting the relative advantages of being born versus never having been born.
Courts have resisted recognition of a wrongful life cause of action on the basis that there is
no legal right not to be born. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978); Stills v.
Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1976); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22,
227 A.2d 689 (1967); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
Wrongful birth refers to an action brought by the parent or parents of an unwanted,
unplanned baby, for damages resulting from the pregnancy, delivery, and birth. The terms
"wrongful conception" and "wrongful pregnancy" have also been employed. See Hartke v.
McKelway, 526 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1981); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169
(Minn. 1977); Holt, Wrongful Pregnancy, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 759, 759 n.6 (1982) ("In a
rapidly expanding field of liability, one cannot expect terminology to be used with precision
while the courts and commentators are still grappling with the theoretical basis for the con-
sequences of imposing that liability").
2. This comment deals exclusively with the birth of healthy, normal babies; many
courts have addressed the issue of awardable damages for the wrongful birth of deformed or
diseased babies. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110
(1981); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975).
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procedure,$ a physician fails to timely diagnose a pregnancy," or a
pharmacist negligently fills a birth control prescription. Wrongful
birth complaints have frequently alleged negligence,6 although they
have also asserted breach of contract, breach of express or implied
warranties,8 misrepresentation,9 or fraud and deceit.10 While courts
have not denied the negligence of defendants and plaintiff-parents
have successfully established negligence and causation in fact, re-
covery of damages is not ensured; although the chain of recovery is
complete, recovery may be denied based upon public policy
considerations. 1
The formulations of awards for damages for wrongful birth are
as diverse as the rationales allowing or denying recovery. Case law
3. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982) (vasectomy); Coleman
v. Garrison, 327 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), afl'd, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1976) (tubal liga-
tion); Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 III. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979) (abortion); Sherlock
v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977) (vasectomy); Martineau v. Nelson, 311
Minn. 92, 247 N.W.2d 409 (1976) (tubal ligation); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404
N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl., 1978) (tubal ligation); Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530
(1947) (abortion).
4. See, e.g., Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rieck v.
Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
5. See, e.g., Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Custodia v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Anony-
mous v. Hospital, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d
230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl.
1978); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982); Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514,-219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Green v. Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978); Christensen
v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934).
8. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Bush-
man v. Burns Clinic Medical Center, 83 Mich. App. 453, 268 N.W.2d 683 (1978); Green v.
Sudakin, 81 Mich. App. 545, 265 N.W.2d 411 (1978); Martineau v. Nelson, 311 Minn. 92, 247
N.W.2d 409 (1976); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982); Vaughn v.
Shelton, 514 S.W.2d 870 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
9. See, e.g., Sutkin v. Beck, 629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App. 1982).
10. See, e.g., Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Ball v.
Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
11. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974), in
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained:
Even where the chain of causation is complete and direct, recovery may sometimes be
denied on grounds of public policy because: (1) The injury is too remote from the
negligence; or (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the
negligent tortfeasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the
negligence should have brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recovery
would place too unreasonable a burden (in the case before us, upon physicians and
obstetricians); or (5) because allowance of recovery would be too likely to open the
way for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowance of recovery would enter a field that has no
sensible or just stopping point.
Id. at 517-18, 219 N.W.2d at 244 (citation omitted).
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has developed varying positions concerning the scope of recovery
for the wrongful birth of healthy babies. Recovery has been en-
tirely denied in some cases; these decisions have, in effect, strictly
applied the "benefits rule." The benefits rule provides: "Where the
defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to
his property and in so doing has conferred upon the plaintiff a spe-
cial benefit to the interest which was harmed, the value of the ben-
efit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, where this is
equitable.' 1 2 Jurisdictions denying any recovery have concluded
that no damages are sustained because the benefits derived from a
healthy baby clearly outweigh as a matter of law any costs incurred
by the parents.'3
A substantial number of courts have determined that parents are
entitled to recover only costs associated with the pregnancy and
delivery, i.e., childbearing costs."' Other courts have allowed a
more complete range of damages, which may be termed child rais-
ing costs, by also permitting parental recovery of the expenses to
be incurred in raising, educating, and maintaining the unwanted
child." The benefits rule has been applied by courts allowing both
types of recovery to reduce damages for tortious conduct by any
"benefits" which such conduct has bestowed upon the plaintiffs."
The benefits rule has been expressly rejected by some courts be-
cause of the impossibility of its application; these courts do not
allow full recovery, but rather deny child raising damages alto-
gether.17 A minority position permits recovery in full, without any
application of the benefits rule."
12. RESTATEzENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 920 (1977).
13. See infra note 27.
14. See Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718 (Ala. 1982); Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239,
628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Coleman v. Garrison, 349 A.2d 8 (Del. 1975); Public Health Trust v.
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44
(Ky. Ct. App. 1982); Kingsbury v. Smith, 442 A.2d 1003 (N.H. 1982); Sala v. Tomlinson, 87
A.D.2d 670, 448 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1982); Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982);
Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974);
Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974); Beardsley v. Wierd-
sma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
15. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 I1. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981); Troppi
v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260
N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977); Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975);
Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
16. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971); Betancourt v.
Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975).
17. See Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974);
Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982).
18. See Cockrum v. Baumgartner, 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981).
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This comment will review the various judicial approaches to
wrongful birth damages. Courts first approached these cases by en-
tirely refusing recovery. 19 With the developing recognition that
parents who sustained their burden of proof have in fact sustained
compensable injuries, three basic approaches have been formu-
lated. Some courts allow partial recovery by permitting childbear-
ing damages, and denying child raising expenses.20 Ironically, child
raising costs have been denied through both strict acceptance and
rejection of the benefits rule. Partial recovery has also been ob-
tained in cases in which parents are awarded the costs of
childbearing and child raising, but the costs of chiid raising are
offset by the application of the benefits rule.21 Recovery in full,
without the application of the benefits rule, has also been awarded
to other litigant-parents.2 '
This comment will advocate that the unplanned pregnancy and
resulting birth of a healthy baby constitutes a compensable injury.
Tortfeasors should not be immunized from full accountability for
their tortious conduct solely because their negligence results in
human life - this conduct remains negligent. In discussing the va-
rious judicial approaches, this comment will suggest that the pub-
lic policy considerations articulated by some courts do not justify a
denial of complete parental compensation. In addition, parents
should not be limited to recoup merely their outlay of medical
costs and pregnancy and delivery expenses; these plaintiffs should
also be able to successfully seek damages for pain and suffering,
wage loss, loss of consortium, and the high costs of educating, rais-
ing, and maintaining the unintended child.
This comment will also examine the benefits rule and conclude
that damages which litigant-parents must incur are very tangible
economic expenses, capable of actuarial calculation. 2 Alleged in-
tangible and personal benefits to parents cannot be properly offset
19. See infra pt. II.
20. See infra pt. III.
21. See infra pt. IV.
22. See infra pt. V.
23. According to Lawrence Olson, an economics analyst, "a reasonably successful busi-
ness family" will spend $323,000 to raise a firstborn son to age 23 or $344,000 to bring up a
daughter, and the average family spends $226,000 to raise a son and $247,000 to raise a
daughter. See Bus. WK., Aug. 30, 1982, at 80. See generally L. OLSON, CosTs OF CHILDREN
(1982). Realistically, although "[t]he smile of a child may be priceless . . . the braces that
may be needed to keep that smile perfect carry a very concrete price tag." See Holt, supra
note 1, at 787.
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against hard, tangible, financial expenditures."' Therefore, dam-
ages recoverable for the costs of food, clothing, and education can-
not be properly reduced by such conjectural benefits as "the satis-
faction, love, joy and pride which an unplanned child may provide
his [or her] parents. 2 5 By employing this type of subjective stan-
dard in weighing the intangible costs and benefits of child raising,
courts will ensure that the benefits rule is applied so that the bene-
fits are measured as they affect the individuals injured, and not
society. The purely emotional benefits of child raising can only be
properly offset against the emotional costs incident to child raising
costs. Affirmative answers to the following issues will be urged:
"Should parents in this sophisticated day and time . . . have a
right to plan their family and avoid the economic hardship of rais-
ing a child they choose not to have? Should a doctor . . . pay for
all the damages occasioned by his [or her] negligent acts?
26
II. RECOVERY REFUSED
The early cases2 7 which approached this issue denied all parental
recovery for the birth of a healthy baby born as a result of a
tortfeasor's negligence. Ethical, religious, and public policy2" con-
siderations prevented the courts from awarding these "fortunate"
parents money damages as compensation for bearing and raising a
child for whom they should feel "blessed. 2 9 This early approach
24. The Restatement definition of the benefits rule, see supra text accompanying note
12, clearly states that the benefit conferred must be to the same interest that was harmed
by the defendant's tortious conduct. In the wrongful birth context, it is difficult to specify
whether financial, social or emotional interests fostered the plaintiff-parents' desire to avoid
childbirth. However, those courts that observe that the plaintiffs are about to enjoy a life-
time of companionship and fulfillment are mistaken if they believe that these are benefits to
the same injured interests that had motivated the plaintiffs' desire to avoid parenthood.
25. Mason v. Western Pa. Hosp., 453 A.2d 974, 981 (Pa. 1982) (Larsen, J., concurring
and dissenting).
26. Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 241, 628 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1982).
27. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934); Shaheen v.
Knight, 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957); Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wash. 2d 247,
391 P.2d 201 (1964).
28. "Public policy" has been defined as:
[Tihe community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied
throughout the state to matters of public morals, public health, public safety, public
welfare, and the like .... [Tihat general and well-settled public opinion relating to
man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow-men, having due regard to all the circum-
stances of each particular relation and situation.
Pittsburgh, C., C & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95 Ohio St. 64, 68, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (1916).
29. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620 (1934). The plaintiff
had been sterilized after receiving a warning that his wife might not survive the birth of
another child; he subsequently sued the surgeon when his wife became pregnant and gave
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overlooked the fact that these particular individuals consciously
and actively sought to prevent childbirth, and that negligently per-
formed sterilization surgery inadvertently brought about the very
event which the surgery was intended to prevent.30 Recovery was
disallowed on the theory that the parents had experienced a
"blessed event"3 and not a compensable injury. The courts were
hesitant to recognize the fact that the births in controversy did by
no means constitute blessings to the litigant parents.
In Ball v. Mudge,32 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed a
jury verdict for the defendant-physicians. The plaintiff-parents
had sought damages for the expenses of delivery, care, mainte-
nance, and support of the child; pain, suffering, and mental
anguish of the plaintiffs; and for the loss of the services, society,
companionship, and consortium of the wife.3 ' Judge Denney ex-
plained that:
As reasonable persons, the jury may well have concluded that appellants
suffered no damage in the birth of a normal, healthy child, whom they
dearly love, would not consider placing for adoption, and 'would not sell for
$50,000,' and that the cost incidental to such birth was far outweighed by
the blessing of a cherished child, albeit an unwanted child at the time of
birth to a healthy baby. Because the wife survived childbirth, the court rejected the plain-
tiff's allegations that he had experienced great anxiety and was subjected to considerable
expense before and after the baby's birth. Id. at 124, 255 N.W. at 621. The court thus found
that no damages were sustained:
[T]he plaintiff has been blessed with the fatherhood of another child. The expenses
alleged are incident to the bearing of a child, and their avoidance is remote from the
avowed purpose of the operation. As well might the plaintiff charge defendant with
the cost of nurture and education of the child during its minority.
Id. at 126, 255 N.W. at 622. The Minnesota Supreme Court's dicta thus seemed to preclude
parents from recovering damages for the economic costs of unplanned children. The Chris-
tensen decision looked at the purpose for which the sterilization was sought, and the pur-
pose was to protect the health of the plaintiff's wife and not to save expenses resulting from
the birth of another child. See Note, Wrongful Birth Damages: Mandate & Mishandling by
Judicial Fiat, 13 VAL. U.L. REv. 127, 134 (1978).
30. See Betancourt v. Gaylor, 136 N.J. Super. 69, 74, 344 A.2d 336, 339 (1975) (plain-
tiffs' complaint alleged denial of the opportunity to be free from the added expense of an-
other child through the defendants' negligence in performing an operation which was
designed to produce that exact result).
31. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 321, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 475 (1976).
32. 64 Wash. 2d 247, 391 P.2d 201 (1964).
33. Judge Denney did not believe that the plaintiffs were entitled to a directed verdict
against the physicians for breach of warranty and negligence in their failure to successfully
sterilize the plaintiff-husband, in light of disputes as to the standard of practice in post-
operative testing, proximate cause, fraud and deceit, and lack of damages from the birth of
a healthy child. Id. at 249-50, 391 P.2d at 203-04.
34. Id. at 248, 391 P.2d at 203.
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conception and birth."
The Common Pleas Court in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, in
Shaheen v. Knight, 6 expressed its reluctance to award the only
damages sought by the plaintiffs, child raising and education ex-
penses, observing that:
We are of the opinion that to allow damages for the normal birth of a nor-
mal child is foreign to the universal sentiment of the people.
To allow damages in a suit such as this would mean that the physician
would have to pay for the fun, joy and affection which the plaintiff Shaheen
will have in the rearing and education of [his] fifth child. Many people
would be willing to support this child were they given the right of custody
and adoption, but according to plaintiff's statement, the plaintiff does not
want such. He wants to have the child and wants the doctor to support it.
In our opinion to allow such damages would be against public policy.
37
35. Id. at 250, 391 P.2d at 204.
36. 6 Lycoming Rptr. 19, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 41 (1957). Due to economic reasons, the
plaintiff-husband underwent a sterilization operation; however, his wife became pregnant
and subsequently gave birth to a healthy child. The plaintiff's complaint alleged:
That the Plaintiff, as a result, despite his love and affection for his fifth (5th)
child, as he would have for any other child, now has the additional expense of sup-
porting, educating and maintaining said child, and that such expense will continue
until the maturity of said child, none of which expense would have been incurred, had
the Defendant, Dr. John E. Knight, fulfilled the contract and undertaking entered
into by him, or fulfilled the representations made by him.
Id. at 20, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 41-42.
37. Id. at 23, 11 Pa. D & C.2d at 45-46 (emphasis added). Judge Williams did note
that a contract to sterilize a man was not "void and against public policy and public
morals." Id. at 20, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d at 43.
Mitigation is currently a non-issue. Although tortfeasors have argued that parents must
attempt to mitigate their damages by obtaining an abortion or placing the child for adop-
tion, this contention has been consistently rejected by the courts. Failure to seek abortion or
refusal to place the healthy infant for adoption is not considered to be a failure to mitigate
damages. See Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Minn. 1977). Professor
McCormick has summarized the rule on mitigation as follows:
If the effort, risk, sacrifice, or expense which the person wronged must incur in order
to avoid or minimize a loss or injury is such that under all the circumstances a rea-
sonable man might well decline to incur it, a failure to do so imposes no disability
against recovering full damages.
C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 35 (1935). Judicial refusal to require parental mitigation through
the use of abortion clinics or adoption agencies is based upon the asserted unreasonableness
of forcing such alternatives upon parents. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 258, 187
N.W.2d 511, 520 (1971) (plaintiffs were only required to take reasonable measures to mini-
mize the defendant's financial liability and "no mother could reasonably be required to
abort or place her child for adoption"); Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 163, 404 N.Y.S.2d
950, 954 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (requirement to obtain an abortion in order to mitigate parental
damages was denounced as "an invasion of privacy of the grossest and most pernicious kind.
The decision to have an abortion or not is for the individual to make, based on whatever
religious, philosophical, or moral principles the individual may adhere to, or upon considera-
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Public policy is, of course, a recognized part of the fiber of our
judicial system, and is often a most necessary logical cornerstone in
the judiciary's ability to create decisions which serve the interests
of society. However, public policy is subject to changes that occur
in society. Outdated public policy considerations do not justify the
denial of parental recovery. Society's attitude toward the family
unit, contraception and childbirth has drastically changed; "atti-
tude[s] toward birth control and the family, as well as the protec-
tion accorded family planning rights by the United States Supreme
Court support the position that a child is not always a 'blessing' to
the family."38 In addition, denial of recovery upon policy grounds
ignores economic reality - parenthood and its accompanying ex-
penses have been forced upon those who consciously sought to
avoid it. Producing and raising children is an expensive endeavor,
and the expense will continue at least until the child reaches ma-
jority. 9 There is obviously an adverse effect on the entire family
unit's economic status when parents are compelled to disperse
care, comfort, and protection to a larger family.'0 As the California
Court of Appeals wisely observed in Custodio v. Bauer,4 the plain-
tiff-parents sought compensation "to replenish the family excheq-
uer so that the new arrival . . . [would] not deprive the other
members of the family of what was planned as their just share of
the family income.'
4 2
Courts are now awarding damages in recent wrongful birth cases
even if parents are realizing only partial recovery. Public policy
considerations do not justify a denial of recovery when tortfeasors
are thereby permitted to escape liability for the financial conse-
tion of the medical risks involved").
In Ziemba v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1974), the defendant-physi-
cian argued that because there was no statutory ban to abortion at that stage of pregnancy
when conception was discovered, the plaintiff-wife's failure to pursue this legal alternative
barred her claim for damages. Judge Del Vecchio of the New York Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, rejected this contention:
The right to have an abortion may not be automatically converted to an obligation to
have one. The decision whether or not to undertake that medical procedure must rest
on a number of factors, including the stage to which pregnancy has progressed, the
health and condition of the woman at that time and the professional judgment and
counsel received.
Id. at 233, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
38. Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of Action-Suggestions for
a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 611, 628 (1980).
39. See supra note 23.
40. See, e.g., Sutkin v. Beck, 629 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
41. 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967).
42. Id. at 324, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 477.
Vol. 21:605
1983 Wrongful Birth Damages
quences of their wrongdoing. One court has stated, "[a] ruling de-
nying any damages .. .would render the medical profession im-
mune from liability for negligent treatment of patients seeking to
limit the size of their families. ' 43 The application of public policy
has been perceived as too vague to be considered useful. 4 In Sher-
lock v. Stillwater Clinic,45 the Minnesota Supreme Court justified
an award of child raising expenses in spite of its awareness of pub-
lic policy:
Ethical and religious considerations aside, it must be recognized that such
costs are a direct financial injury to the parents, no different in immediate
effect than the medical expenses resulting from the wrongful conception
and birth of the child. Although public sentiment may recognize that to the
vast majority of parents the long-term and enduring benefits of parenthood
outweigh the economic costs of rearing a healthy child, it would seem my-
opic to declare today that those benefits exceed the costs as a matter of
law."
III. PARTIAL RECOVERY-CHILDBEARING EXPENSES ALLOWED,
CHILD RAISING COSTS DENIED
Rejection and Strict Application of the Benefits Rule
Many courts have awarded damages sustained in connection
with pregnancy and delivery, but have rejected the contention that
the child can in any way constitute a detriment after birth. Upon
what reasons have such denials been based? Public policy is fre-
quently cited as a basis upon which to deny recovery of the costs of
care, maintenance, support, and education, although the courts ar-
ticulate public policy in various ways.47 Public policy has been in-
43. Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 292 (Wyo. 1982).
44. Justice Dudley of the Arkansas Supreme Court renounced the invocation of public
policy to avoid the application of common law because of "the lack of a standard by which
[to] determine when to apply public policy and the lack of a meaningful definition by which
[to] discover what constitutes public policy." Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d
568, 572 (1982) (Dudley, J., dissenting). At common law, tortfeasors were liable for their
negligence, and for all damages flowing from it. Justice Dudley stated that he "would not
invoke public policy in order to deny a cause of action against the common law rules of tort
damages when there is no logical sense of conscience." Id. at 245, 628 S.W.2d at 572 (Dud-
ley, J., dissenting). This comment will further evaluate public policy considerations with
regard to the denial of child raising expenses. See infra pt. III.
45. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
46. Id. at 175.
47. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982); Wilczynski v. Good-
man, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979); Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35
A.D.2d 531, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1970), afl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640
(1972); Hays v. Hall, 477 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 488
S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1973); Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
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yoked to prevent recovery because of the sentiment that the birth
of a normal, healthy infant fails to constitute a compensable
injury. 8
In Terrell v. Garcia,"' one reason for the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals' denial of recovery for child raising expenses was that such
damages were too speculative and uncertain. 0 The Terrells had
waived all other items of damages, such as medical expenses and
the pain and anguish of Mrs. Terrell incident to childbirth. 1 Judge
Barrow disagreed with the offsetting nature of the benefits rule
5 2
and instead denied recovery for child raising damages based on
public policy considerations, holding that children confer tangible
economic benefits upon their parents which outweigh losses:
[A] strong case can be made that, at least in an urban society, the rearing of
a child would not be a profitable undertaking if considered from the eco-
nomics alone. Nevertheless . . . the satisfaction, joy and companionship
which normal parents have in rearing a child make such economic loss
worthwhile. These intangible benefits, while impossible to value in dollars
and cents are undoubtedly the things that make life worthwhile. Who can
place a price tag on a child's smile or the parental pride in a child's achieve-
ment? Even if we consider only the economic point of view, a child is some
security for the parents' old age. Rather than attempt to value these intan-
gible benefits, our courts have simply determined that public sentiment rec-
ognizes that these benefits to the parents outweigh their economic loss in
rearing and educating a healthy, normal child. We see no compelling reason
(1974).
48. In Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979), the plaintiff
sued her physician for failure to perform a proper abortion. The Illinois Abortion Act of
1975, in effect at that time, prohibited abortions unless necessary to preserve the mother's
life. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-21 (1977) (repealed 1979). Justice Hartman of the Appellate
Court of Illinois denied the plaintiff-mother child raising costs:
In our judgment, a public policy which deems precious even potential life while yet in
the womb, at such cost and expense that condition may entail, does not countenance
as compensable damage to its parent or parents those additional costs and expenses
necessary to sustain and nurture that life once it comes to fruition upon and after
successful birth. The existence of a normal, healthy life is an esteemed right under
our laws, rather than a compensable wrong.
73 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 391 N.E.2d at 487. Note that this public policy view, while similar in
nature, is not an application of the benefits rule.
49. 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 927 (1974).
50. Id. at 127.
51. Id.
52. Id. Judge Barrow explained that:
[A]doption of the "benefits rule" . . . would present insurmountable problems of
proof under our present standards for proof of damages. Proof could undoubtedly be
offered regarding the cost of care and maintenance for a hypothetical child, although
the standard of living and extent of education to be provided such child would un-
doubtedly require considerable conjecture and speculation by the trier of facts.
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to change such rule at this time."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Rieck v. Medical Protective
Co.,54 found that public policy prohibited recovery of child rearing
costs because parents would unreasonably shift the financial costs
of raising the child to the tortfeasor, while they continued to retain
custody; the court expressed concern that this would in effect cre-
ate a new category of surrogate parent." The benefits rule was ex-
pressly rejected by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Beardsley v.
Wierdsma, e and various reasons were offered for its rejection of
the parental claim for damages after childbirth:
[T]hese. . .expenses are too speculative. . . the injury is too remote from
the negligence . . . the injury is out of proportion to the culpability of the
53. Id. at 128. It is speculative and factually unsupportable to expect that children
generally take care of their elderly parents. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 255, 187
N.W.2d 511, 518 (1971). It is arguably the exception, rather than the rule, when parents
receive more economic support from their children in their old age than the parents pro-
vided to the children as they grew up. The Terrell court was correct in not applying the
benefits rule, because any alleged benefits conferred upon parents through unwanted births
are either highly speculative from an economic viewpoint or are intangible, personal awards
which should not be offset against hard money costs; however, costs of child raising should
have been awarded in full.
54. 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242 (1974).
55. Justice Hansen explained that:
To permit the parents to keep their child and shift the entire cost of its upbringing to
a physician who failed to determine or inform them of the fact of pregnancy would be
to create a new category of surrogate parent. Every child's smile, every bond of love
and affection, every reason for parental pride in a child's achievements, every contri-
bution by the child to the welfare and well-being of the family and parents, is to
remain with the mother and father. For the most part, these are intangible benefits,
but they are nonetheless real. On the other hand, every financial cost or detri-
ment-what the complaint terms "hard money damages"-including the cost of food,
clothing and education, would be shifted to the physician who allegedly failed to
timely diagnose the fact of pregnancy. We hold that such result would be wholly out
of proportion to the culpability involved, and that the allowance of recovery would
place too unreasonable a burden upon physicians, under the facts and circumstances
here alleged.
Id. at 518-19, 219 N.W.2d at 244-45 (footnote omitted).
56. 650 P.2d 288 (Wyo. 1982). Justice Brown specifically rejected the benefits rule, id.
at 292, and observed that:
The benefit or offset concept smacks of condemnation law, where the trier of fact
determines the value of the land taken by the condemnor. The trier of fact then
determines the benefit that results to the land owner, which benefit is deducted from
the original value to determine the proper award. If the concept of benefit or offset
were applied to "wrongful birth" actions, we can conceive of the ridiculous result that
benefits could be greater than damages, in which event someone could argue that the
parents would owe something to the tortfeasor. We think that a child should not be
viewed as a piece of property, with fact finders first assessing the expense and damage
incurred because of that child's life, then deducting the value of that child's life.
Id. at 293.
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tortfeasors; and. . . the allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable
a burden on [the tortfeasors], since it would likely open the way for fraudu-
lent claims, and since it would enter a field that has no sensible or just
stopping point.5
7
The Beardsley court provided a definite demarcation of what dam-
ages could be recovered, including the medical expenses associated
with the unsuccessful sterilization operation, surgical, and hospital
expenses, physicians' fees, medication costs, medical and hospital
expenses for the birth of the unplanned child, wage loss, the
mother's pain and suffering in connection with the pregnancy, the
cost of abortion, plus the pain and suffering of women who elected
to undergo abortions. However, any claim for damages of child
raising expenses, incurred after childbirth, was rejected. 8
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also denied child raising ex-
penses in Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital.59 Justice Rob-
erts enunciated the Commonwealth's public policy as the recogni-
tion of the "paramount importance of the family to society" and
then held, as a matter of law, "that the benefits of joy, companion-
ship, and affection which a normal, healthy child can provide must
be deemed . ..to outweigh the costs of raising that child." 0
Courts have also justified denial by emphasizing the unwanted
child who discovers in the future that the costs of his or her up-
bringing were paid for by another. The Arkansas Supreme Court,
in Wilbur v. Kerr,61 described the issue of parental recovery of
child rearing costs:
[It] is a question which meddles with the concept of life and the stability of
the family unit. Litigation cannot answer every question; every question
cannot be answered in terms of dollars and cents. We are also convinced
that the damage to the child will be significant; that being an unwanted or
"emotional bastard," who will some day learn that its parents did not want
57. Id. at 292. The type of fraudulent claims to which the court referred might be
claims for failure to timely diagnose pregnancy situations in which the parents allege that
they would have aborted had they been timely informed of the pregnancy. The court's fear
of fraudulent claims would apparently not extend into the negligently performed steriliza-
tion and abortion cases. Further, the court's position ignores the realities of medical mal-
practice insurance and the fact that the negligent physician or surgeon is burdened only to
the extent of premium and deductible payments. For example, Pennsylvania limits a physi-
cian's liability to $100,000 and provides a contributory "Catastrophe Loss Fund" to supple-
ment awards in excess of that amount. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.701(a)(1)(i), (d)
(Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
58. 650 P.2d at 292.
59. 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982).
60. Id. at 976.
61. 275 Ark. 239, 628 S.W.2d 568 (1982).
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it and, in fact, went to court to force someone else to pay for its raising, will
be harmful to that child. It will undermine society's need for a strong and
healthy family relationship. We have not become so sophisticated a society
to dismiss that emotional trauma as nonsense."
The court derived the "emotional bastard" label from several com-
mentaries 3 defining the term as an unwanted child who discovers
some day that he or she was unwanted, and whose costs of raising
were paid by another." The Minnesota Supreme Court noted the
impact which the award of child raising expenses could have on the
family unit in Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic," but stressed the ne-
cessity for such compensation under ordinary tort law principles:
The result we reach today is at best a mortal attempt to do justice in an
imperfect world. In this endeavor we are not unmindful of the deep and
often times painful ethical problems that cases of this nature will continue
to pose for both courts and litigants. It is therefore our hope that future
parents and attorneys would give serious reflection to the silent interests of
the child and, in particular, the parent-child relationship that must be sus-
tained long after legal controversies have been laid to rest."
The award of child rearing expenses has also been avoided through
the determination that such matters should be resolved by the leg-
islature, and not by the judiciary. 7
The provision of child raising damages is the most difficult area
of consideration because the negligence of the defendants must be
weighed against the social questions at stake. Proven child raising
expenses should be awarded in all wrongful birth actions, so that
unwanted children may receive adequate financial support in situ-
ations in which parents may not have otherwise been able to pro-
vide it. Although the child was originally unplanned, any emotional
injury to the child upon discovery of this fact should be no greater
"than that to be found in many families where 'planned
parenthood' has not followed the blueprint."'
In those states which allow child raising damages if the un-
62. Id. at 241, 628 S.W.2d at 570.
63. Robertson, Civil Liability Arising from "Wrongful Birth" Following an Unsuc-
cessful Sterilization Operation, 4 AM. J.L. & MmD., 131, 153 (1978-79); Bryan, Dam-
ages-The Not So "Blessed Event," 46 N.C.L. Riy. 948, 952 (1968).
64. 275 Ark. at 241, 628 S.W.2d at 570.
65. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977).
66. Id. at 176-77 (footnotes omitted).
67. See Christensen v. Thornby, 192 Minn. 123, 125, 255 N.W. 620, 621 (1934); Ziemba
v. Sternberg, 45 A.D.2d 230, 234, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 270 (1974) (Cardamone, J., dissenting);
Stewart v. Long Island College Hosp., 35 A.D.2d 531, 532, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502, 503 (App. Div.
1970), afl'd, 30 N.Y.2d 695, 283 N.E.2d 616, 332 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1972).
68. Custodio v. Bauer, 251 Cal. App. 2d 303, 318, 59 Cal. Rptr. 463, 477 (1967).
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wanted child is born defective, public policy considerations for the
denial of these damages for a healthy baby have been criticized
when "the same public policy allows [the courts] to hold that the
parents of a deformed or diseased child are able to recover." 9 In
his concurring and dissenting opinion in Mason v. Western Penn-
sylvania Hospital,70 Chief Justice O'Brien of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court could find no justifiable reason for differentiating be-
tween the birth of a healthy child and the birth of a genetically
defective child.7 ' The result is inconsistent because "[iut is not the
relative health of the child, but is instead the alleged negligence of
the physician, that gives rise to all damages that are foreseeable.
'7 2
IV. PARTIAL RECOVERY-CHILDBEARING AND CHILD RAISING
EXPENSES ALLOWED - THE BENEFITS RULE APPLIED
Denial of all recovery is, in effect, a strict application of the ben-
efits rule. Courts which have denied all recovery have ruled as a
matter of law that intangible benefits of parenthood outweigh eco-
nomic costs and losses in rearing and educating a normal child.73
On the other hand, courts which have awarded partial recovery do
not find that benefits strictly outweigh all expenses. This approach
does take account of the benefits conferred upon the parents
through the birth of a healthy child, and offsets these benefits
against parental recovery.
The benefits rule is utilized to reduce recoverable damages by
any benefits conferred upon the parents through the tortfeasor's
negligent conduct.74 Courts which apply the benefits rule have de-
termined that "the defendant who simultaneously injures and con-
fers a benefit to the same interest of the plaintiff is entitled to
have the benefit considered in mitigation of damages. 7 5
69. Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 244, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1982) (Dudley, J.,
dissenting).
70. 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982).
71. Id. at 976 (O'Brien, C.J., concurring and dissenting). Pennsylvania allows parents
to recover for the child raising costs of a defective child. See Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77,
439 A.2d 110 (1981).
72. 453 A.2d at 977 (O'Brien, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
73. See Terrell v. Garcia, 496 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
927 (1974).
74. See supra text accompanying note 12.
75. Comment, Wrongful Birth: The Emerging Status of a New Tort, 8 ST. M~Av's L.J.
140, 152 (1976). Therefore, "[wihen a defendant's tortious actions benefit as well as injure
plaintiff, a computation of damages [requires] that the award for the injury be reduced by
the value of the benefit." Comment, Liability for Failure of Birth Control Methods, 76
COLUM. L. Rzv. 1187, 1197-98 (1976). See Stills v. Gratton, 55 Cal. App. 3d 698, 127 Cal.
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The Court of Appeals of Michigan, in Troppi v. Scarf e7 recog-
nized that the benefits of parenthood do not always exceed the in-
cident costs, and refused to state as a matter of law that a healthy
child always confers so substantial a benefit as to outweigh ex-
penses of birth and support. 7 Presiding Judge Levine repudiated
the reasoning of those cases in which parental recovery was en-
tirely denied because the benefits eradicated costs, because those
opinions in essence declared that "as a matter of law, the services
and companionship of a child have a dollar equivalent greater than
the economic costs of his support, to say nothing of the inhibitions,
the restrictions, and the pain and suffering caused by pregnancy
and the obligation to rear the child.
' '78
The Troppis' complaint alleged four separate items of damages:
Mrs. Troppi's lost wages, medical and hospital expenses, the pain
and anxiety incident to childbirth, and the economic costs of rais-
ing their eighth child.79 The court rejected the trial court's finding
that an award of damages would contravene public policy,80 and
found that in light of the great number of oral contraceptive users,
a recovery by the plaintiff-parents would further the public policy
of encouraging pharmacists to exercise great care while filling birth
control prescriptions. 81
Rptr. 652 (1976); Anonymous v. State, 33 Conn. Supp. 126, 366 A.2d 204 (1976); Bowman v.
Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 356 N.E.2d 496 (1976).
76. 31 Mich. App. 240, 187 N.W.2d 511 (1971). The defendant-pharmacist negligently
supplied the wrong drug, a mild tranquilizer, to a married woman who had ordered birth
control pills; she subsequently became pregnant and delivered a normal, healthy baby. Id. at
243, 187 N.W.2d at 512-13.
77. Id. at 254, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
78. Id. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
79. Id. at 244, 187 N.W.2d at 513. The lower court had dismissed the complaint, be-
cause "whatever damage plaintiffs suffered was more than offset by the benefit to them of
having a healthy child." Id. On appeal, the First Division of the Michigan Court of Appeals
determined that there was no valid reason why the trier of fact should not be free to assess
damages as it would in other negligence cases. Id. at 252, 187 N.W.2d at 516. Judge Levine
found the presence of basic tort liability- "The defendant's conduct constituted a clear
breach of duty. A pharmacist is held to a very high standard of care in filling birth control
prescriptions. When he negligently supplies a drug other than the drug requested, he is
liable for resulting harm to the purchaser." Id. at 245, 187 N.W.2d at 513.
80. As the court explained:
Contraceptives are used to prevent the birth of healthy children. To say that for
reasons of public policy contraceptive failure can result in no damage as a matter of
law ignores the fact that tens of millions of persons use contraceptives daily to avoid
the very result which the defendant would have us say is always a benefit, never a
detriment. Those tens of millions of persons, by their conduct, express the sense of
the community.
Id. at 253, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
81. "To absolve defendant of all liability here would be to remove one deterrent
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Although all of the elements of damages alleged by the plaintiffs
were found to be recoverable, 2 Judge Levine held that the benefits
rule was pertinent,83 and thus the benefits resulting from the birth
of the unplanned child would be weighed against all of the claimed
damages. The trier of fact could evaluate the benefits in light of
the particular circumstances presented in each case, such as "fam-
ily size, family income, age of the parents, and marital status." 4
The Troppi court rejected the defendant's contention that dam-
ages could not be properly calculated because of uncertainty or dif-
ficulty in their assessment: "[D]ifficulty in determining the amount
to be subtracted from the gross damages does not justify throwing
up our hands and denying recovery altogether."85
In Betancourt v. Gaylor,8 6 the New Jersey Superior Court also
accepted the application of the benefits rule to parental recovery.
Although, as a matter of law, any damages proximately resulting
from the defendants' negligence could be recovered, including the
costs, emotional distress and physical inconvenience of rearing a
child,87 these damages must be offset by any benefits accrued.8 8
The Minnesota Supreme Court also applied the benefits rule in
against the negligent dispensing of drugs. Given the great numbers of women who currently
use oral contraceptives, such absolution cannot be defended on public policy grounds." Id.
at 254, 187 N.W.2d at 517. The court also considered that contraceptive use falls within the
constitutionally protected zone of privacy developed in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965). Id. at 253-54, 187 N.W.2d at 517.
82. See supra text accompanying-note 78.
83. "Thus, if the defendant's tortious conduct conferred a benefit to the same interest
which was harmed by his conduct, the dollar value of the benefit is to be subtracted from
the dollar value of the injury in arriving at the amount of the damages properly awardable."
31 Mich. App. at 255, 187 N.W.2d at 518.
84. Id. at 257, 187 N.W.2d at 519.
85. Id. at 261, 187 N.W.2d at 521. All four claimed items of damages could be assessed
competently by the trier of fact and any alleged uncertainty in computation did not render
damages unduly speculative. Id. at 262, 187 N.W.2d at 521.
86. 136 N.J. Super. 69, 344 A.2d 336 (1975). After an unsuccessful bilateral tubal liga-
tion resulted in the birth of an unplanned, healthy child, the parents brought suit against
the surgeon, the pathologist, and the family planning clinic, alleging their medical costs,
emotional distress, and physical inconvenience in raising the healthy child as a measure of
their damages sustained. Id. at 71, 344 A.2d at 337.
87. Id. at 77, 344 A.2d at 340. Damages were to be measured, as normally calculated in
tort actions, by comparing the plaintiff's impaired condition as a result of the defendant's
negligence with the condition the plaintiff would have been in without such negligence oc-
curring. Id. at 75, 344 A.2d at 339-40.
88. "[Tlhe elements of benefit and loss are separate. The loss is the financial expense
which plaintiffs sought to obviate by submitting to surgery. The benefit is whatever benefit
a jury may reasonably conclude has accrued to plaintiffs as a result of the newborn child.
These are relatively tangible and measurable factors for a jury to consider separate from
each other . . . ." Id. at 75, 344 A.2d at 339.
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Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic.89 The parents were permitted to re-
cover all of the reasonably foreseeable costs, including prenatal
and postnatal medical expenses, the mother's pain and suffering
during pregnancy and delivery, loss of consortium, and child rear-
ing expenses, offset by the value of the child's aid, comfort, and
society during the parents' life expectancy.90 Judge Rogacheski was
unconvinced that public policy justifies a denial of recovery be-
cause such actions should be treated as negligence cases."' Child
raising costs were awarded by the court:
[We are] unconvinced that a physician should be held harmless for the eco-
nomic costs of supporting an unplanned child. Thus, in obedience to the
rule of law, we feel compelled to conclude that where the parents of an un-
planned, healthy child choose to include this item of damages in their claim,
hopefully after being advised of the psychological consequences which could
result from litigating such claim, we will permit them to recover the reason-
ably foreseeable costs of rearing, subject to an offset for the value of the
benefits conferred to them by the child."
The benefits rule is misapplied in wrongful birth cases because
the defendants at bar cause injury to tangible economic interests.
Any alleged benefits simultaneously conferred upon litigant-par-
ents are intangible, personal benefits. It would therefore be im-
proper to award damages for the financial costs of child raising,
and then reduce the award by non-economically speculative bene-
fits. Financial injury to the plaintiffs, which is a direct result when
parents must pay for the costs of pregnancy, delivery and upbring-
ing, are hard tangible expenses, readily capable of ascertainment
actuarially: "[sluch calculations are made by estate planners, in-
surance companies and sometimes by private parties as incident to
89. 260 N.W.2d 169 (Minn. 1977). The court added to the existing confusion in termi-
nology by referring to the cause of action as one for "wrongful conception." Id. at 170. See
supra note 1.
90. 260 N.W.2d at 170-71.
91. Id. at 174. The court stated:
Pretermitting moral and theological considerations, we are not persuaded that
public policy considerations can properly be used to deny recovery to parents of an
unplanned, healthy child of all damages proximately caused by a negligently per-
formed sterilization operation. Analytically, such an action is indistinguishable from
an ordinary medical negligence action where a plaintiff alleges that a physician has
breached a duty of care owed to him with resulting injurious consequences. Where
the purpose of the physician's actions is to prevent conception or birth, elementary
justice requires that he be held legally responsible for the consequences which have in
fact occurred.
Id. (footnote omitted).
92. Id. at 176.
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support proceedings or matrimonial settlements."93 It is arguably
improper to award damages for expenses and then reduce them by
the value which a court or jury places upon the child's smiles,
hugs, and kisses. Further, the benefits rule fails to consider the sig-
nificant intangible costs and detriments which accompany
parenthood, such as meal preparation, baby-sitting and the psy-
chological concerns all parents experience when raising a child.
There is no question that even unplanned, unwanted children do
confer benefits of some sort upon their parents."" However, these
benefits are speculative and incapable of dollar evaluation. Fur-
ther, if the courts choose to consider these intangible benefits when
calculating damage awards, they should also be cognizant of intan-
gible costs and detriments necessarily incident to parenthood when
the child to be raised was unplanned. The benefits rule, as tradi-
tionally applied, is improper when courts adjudicate wrongful birth
damage awards.
V. ALL DAMAGES RECOVERABLE IN FULL
Public policy should not preclude parents from seeking and re-
covering child raising expenses, in addition to the clearly recover-
able childbearing expenses, such as medical and hospital expenses,
wage loss, and pain and suffering.98 Further, the benefits rule
should not be applicable to offset the financial costs of parenthood
by its emotional rewards. In his concurring and dissenting opinion
in Mason v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital,6 Justice Larsen of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court succinctly recognized that the
applicability of the benefits rule would undermine the principles of
making the plaintiff whole, deterring future negligence, and en-
couraging desirable conduct. He observed that:
Feeding, clothing and educating an unplanned child entails a certain
.amount of expense, and it is this expense for which parents must be com-
pensated in order to be made whole. Whatever those expenses are deter-
mined to be, they are simply not reduced by the satisfaction, love, joy and
pride which an unplanned child may provide his parents. The "benefit rule"
would reduce the damages awarded to parents of children who possess these
endearing abilities, thus preventing the parents from being fully compen-
93. Rivera v. State, 94 Misc. 2d 157, 161, 404 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
94. But see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, § 3.6 (1973) (a person
cannot be forced to accept a benefit that he or she does not want).
95. See Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 254, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
96. 453 A.2d 974 (Pa. 1982).
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sated and made whole.. 7
The benefits rule has also been criticized because it encourages
parents to deny their love for the child or to deny that they are
benefited from the birth in order to receive greater compensaton.
The absurdity becomes apparent with the recognition that if par-
ents "admit that the child is a welcome addition that will be loved,
cherished, and properly raised, they may get nothing."98 Justice
Larsen has noted that:
Society is disserved by a rule which "punishes" those parents who make
the effort to raise an unplanned child and who give that child the love and
emotional, social and economic support which will help that child become a
person capable of returning love and care to his [or her] parents, while "re-
warding" those parents who can prove to a jury that they cannot or do not
provide their children with the love and emotional, social and economic
support they need, thus producing children who themselves cannot or do
not return any of these intangible benefits to their parents. Society favors
and supports those families in which children-including those whose births
were unplanned-receive from their parents the love and support they need
to grow and develop into loving and supportive adults, yet with the applica-
tion of the "benefit rule," 'a great anomaly becomes apparent; the more lov-
ing the parent, the smaller the damage award and the more the entire fam-
ily will suffer as scarce economic resources are spread over a greater number
of family members."
Although Justice Larsen believed that the emotional benefits of
child raising should be deducted from the emotional trauma, he
disagreed that the benefits rule should be applied so that defen-
dants could deduct benefits twice, first from damages for child
raising trauma and second from the actual expenses of raising the
child, because this would in effect give windfalls to defendants.10°
The best approach to the issue of damages in wrongful birth-
cases was expounded by Justice Jiganti of the Appellate Court of
Illinois in Cockrum v. Baumgartner.101 Justice Jiganti refused to
limit damages to pregnancy and birth related costs, because he did
not believe that public policy justified a denial of full recovery for
97. Id. at 981 (Larsen, J., concurring and dissenting).
98. Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 242, 628 S.W.2d 568, 571 (1982).
99. 453 A.2d at 981 (Larsen, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Kashi, The Case
of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Birth, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1409, 1417 (1977)).
100. 453 A.2d at 981 n.1.
101. 99 Ill. App. 3d 271, 425 N.E.2d 968 (1981). Cockrum involved two cases, one alleg-
ing a negligently performed sterilization operation and the other asserting negligent mis-
diagnosis of pregnancy, which were consolidated on appeal. In both cases, the trial court
dismissed the counts which sought child raising expenses upon the holding in Wilczynski v.
Goodman, 73 Ill. App. 3d 51, 391 N.E.2d 479 (1979). See supra note 48.
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damages caused by the tortfeasors' negligence:
While we agree that most parents hold the sentiment that the birth of a
healthy albeit unplanned child is always a benefit, we are not inclined to
raise this sentiment to the level of public policy. The uniqueness of life is in
no way denigrated by a couple's choice not to have a child. Neither the
individual nor society as a whole is harmed by the exercise of this choice.
Recognizing this, the right to limit procreation through contraception and,
to a limited extent abortion, has been held to come within a constitutionally
protected "zone of privacy.". . . Regardless of motivation, a couple has the
right to determine whether they will have a child. That right is legally pro-
tectible and need not be justified or explained. The allowance of rearing
costs is not an aspersion upon the value of the child's life. It is instead a
recognition of the importance of the parent's fundamental right to control
their reproductivity. . . . We cannot endorse a view that effectively nullifies
this right by providing that its violation results in no injury. For these rea-
sons, we are not persuaded that public policy considerations can properly be
used to deny recovery to parents of an unplanned child of the full measure
of all damages proximately caused by a physician's negligence. 2
The court also determined that the benefits rule has been misap-
plied in wrongful birth cases because the application permitted the
emotional rewards of having a child to offset financial costs; there-
fore, benefits were not conferred upon the same interest which was
harmed. '03 Thus, the emotional rewards of parenthood could not
offset financial child rearing costs.
104
VI. CONCLUSION
All proven economic losses, including the financial expenses of
child raising, education and maintenance, should be recoverable in
wrongful birth actions. Total recovery will fully compensate those
parents who consciously and deliberately attempted to prevent the
occurrence of childbirth. Tortfeasors must bear the full responsi-
bility for the natural, probable consequences and all foreseeable
damages directly resulting from their negligence.105 Damages, as
compensation to plaintiffs for injuries caused by a tortfeasor's
breach of duty, are awarded to repair plaintiffs' injuries and to
make them whole."0 6 Courts must recognize that all expenses for
102. 99 11. App. 3d at 273, 425 N.E.2d at 970 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 26.
104. 99 Ill. App. 3d at 274, 425 N.E.2d at 970 ("rewards [of parenthood] are emotional
in nature and, great though they may be, do nothing whatever to benefit the plaintiff's
injured financial interest"). See Kashi, The Case of the Unwanted Blessing: Wrongful Life,
31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1409, 1415 (1977).
105. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (4th ed. 1971).
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raising an unplanned, unwanted child are foreseeable damages
which result directly from the tortfeasor's proven and established
negligence. Partial recovery will encourage negligence and protect
tortfeasors from full accountability for their wrongs.
Unlike the early decisions which first addressed the issue, recent
adjudication of wrongful birth claims has resulted in parental re-
covery. However, not all parents have been awarded the same
items of damages. Child raising expenses have been denied through
both strict application and express rejection of the benefits rule.
Both rationales misinterpret the benefits rule. The benefits rule
can only be properly applied to offset the emotional trauma of
child rearing by the emotional, intangible benefits inherent in rais-
ing a child. Obviously, this approach maintains that emotional dis-
tress damages are also within the natural and probable conse-
quences of the tortfeasor's negligent acts. The intangible personal
benefits of having a child cannot be properly applied to offset dam-
ages for tangible financial injuries to the parents; emotional and
financial interests are entirely distinct.
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